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Occupational Licensing: How States and Professionals
Work to Keep the Poor from Working
Seth Johnson
An occupational license is a governmental permission to work in a particu-
lar field.' Occupational licensing emerged under the auspices of protecting
consumers and establishing high standards for products and services.2 Though
forms of occupational licensing have existed since medieval times, the nine-
teenth century marked the emergence of widespread licensing in the United
States.' During this early period, licensing laws focused predominantly on the
medical profession.4 In 1889, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a West
Virginia law requiring graduation from an accredited medical school, and ei-
ther passage of an exam or requisite experience, in order to practice as a physi-
cian.' In Dent v. West Virginia, the Court upheld the aforementioned law,
holding that the state's interests in protecting health and safety were sufficient
grounds to allow some restrictions on a person's pursuit of work.' Since the
Dent decision, courts have generally upheld state licensing laws.7 By the 1950s,
a little under five percent of workers required a state-issued license.' In 2008,
the proportion grew to twenty-nine percent.9
If twenty-nine percent sounds high, that's because it is. 10 Though occupa-
tional licensing often proceeds from a desire to protect public safety, the
1 Dick M. Carpenter et al., License to Work: Introduction, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (2012),
https://ij.org/report/license-to-work/introduction/.
2 Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, The Hamilton Project 5
(2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THPKleinerDiscPaper_final
.pdf.
3 Paul Larkin, A Brief History of Occupational Licensing, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(2017), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/brief-history-occupational-licen
sing-0.
4 Id.
5 Id
6 Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S 114, 121-124 (1889).
7 C. Jarrett Dieterle & Shoshana Weissmann, The Licensing Logjam, 37 NATIONAL AFFAIRS
(Spring 2018), available at https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-licensing-log
jam.
8 Kleiner, supra note 2.
9 Id.
10 See Morris M. Kleiner, The Influence of Occupational Licensing and Regulation, IZA
WORLD OF LABOR, 2 (2017), https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/392/pdfs/the-influence-of-oc
cupational-licensing-and-regulation.pdf (Reporting a lower U.K licensing rate of 19% of the
working population).
1
Johnson: Occupational Licensing: How States and Professionals Work to Keep
Published by LAW eCommons, 2018
Loyola Public Interest Law Reporter
growth of licensing victimizes many citizens it was initially intended to pro-
tect." Many recent anecdotes illustrate this point. In New York City, health
department officials issued violations carrying $1,000 fines to two residents
who pet-sat without a license.1 2 In Arizona, a formerly homeless man studying
cosmetology was investigated and threatened with penalties by the state's li-
censing board after giving free haircuts to the homeless." A recent Georgia law
created licensing requirements for lactation consultants - women who help
teach and assist new mothers with breastfeeding.1 ' When the law was still
being debated, the state licensing board released a statement opposing the bill,
arguing that it would harm women in low-income, minority, and rural areas.1 5
The state legislature passed the bill anyway, leaving ninety percent of the 800
lactation consultants in Georgia ineligible to continue work.1" In order to be-
come eligible, the consultants must complete two years of college courses and
demonstrate proof of over 300 hours of clinical experience. 1 7 Georgia is the
only state with such stringent requirements, and one of only three states that
regulates lactation consultants at all.1
For the poor, losing the ability to work due to a licensing law can lead to
losing much more.1 " In 2003, a Louisiana woman named Sandy Meadows ran
afoul of the Louisiana Horticulture Commission for practicing floristry with-
out a license.2 0 Meadows had over ten years of experience arranging flowers,2 1
11 See Carpenter, supra note 1.
12 Patrice Lee Onwuka, New York's crackdown on dog-walking licenses is only hurting low-
income workers, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Jul. 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
new-yorks-crackdown-on-dog-walking-licenses-is-only-hurting-low-income-workers.
13 Shoshana Weissmann & C. Jarred Dieterle, Is It Wrong to Cut a Homeless Man ' Hair
Without a License?, WALLSTREET JOURNAL (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-
wrong-to-cut-a-homeless-mans-hair-without-a-license-i 523209162.
14 Jamie Cavanaugh, Breastfeeding can be difficult, but a law to license lactation consultants
may make it even harder, THINK (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/amp/ncna89
6566.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Shoshana Weissmann & Jarret Dieterle, Louisiana is the only state that requires occupational
licenses for florists. It' absurd., USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2018/03/28/louisiana-only-state-requires-occupational-licenses-florists-its-absurd-col
umn/ 4 59619002/.
20 Jacob Sullum, Flower Power, REASON (Jan. 9, 2004), https://reason.com/archives/2004/
01/09/flower-power.
21 Id.
2
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22but she never passed the state's floristry exam in any of her five attempts.
Despite failing the state examinations, the quality of Meadows' work appeared
evident to others. 23 In addition to her regular job at Wal-Mart where she cy-
cled through many departments including floristry, Meadows was often asked
to fill in at another store's florist department. 24 She was approached by an
inspector from the commission while working at the second store.2 5 The in-
spector threatened her with a $250 fine if she did not throw out all of the
arrangements she made earlier in the day.26 Joined by several other unlicensed
florists, Meadows eventually filed a federal lawsuit against the Louisiana Horti-
culture Commission, in the hope of overturning the licensing requirements on
constitutional grounds.27 Meadows never lived to see the outcome of the
case, 28 dying a year after being forced out of floristry, without a car, telephone,
or working electricity. 29 A federal judge vacated the lawsuit in 2006 after Hur-
ricane Katrina and various other circumstances coalesced to render it moot.3 0
THE COST OF EXCESSIVE LICENSING
While it is impossible to put a number on human despair, the broader
economic impacts are measurable. 1 Occupational licensing demonstrably
reduces job growth and employment opportunities for low-income individuals
in particular.32 There are up to 2.85 million fewer jobs that would otherwise
exist but for current levels of occupational licensing.33 It is estimated that the
extra cost to consumers is up to $203 billion annually.3 ' Given these statistics,
it is easy to see how the costs to society add up. Consider ninety-percent of the
800 lactation consultants in Georgia excluded from work by the new licensing
22 Weissmann & Dieterle, supra note 19.
23 Sandy Meadows, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, https://ij.org/client/sandy-meadows/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 7, 2018).
24 Id.
25 Sullum, supra note 20
26 Id.
27 John Kramer, Louisiana Florists Seek Independence From State Licensing Scheme, INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE (Jul. 1, 2005), https://ij.org/press-release/louisiana-florists-old-release-7-1-2005/.
28 See Sandra Horn Meadows Obituary, THE ADVOCATE (Oct.7, 2004), https://obits.theadvo
cate.com/obituaries/theadvocate/obituary.aspx?n=sandra-horn-meadows&pid=2683349.
29 Weissmann & Dieterle, supra note 19.
30 John Kramer, Louisiana Florist Case Moot, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 1, 2006), https:/
/ij.org/case/meadows-v-odom/.
31 Kleiner, supra note 2.
32 See Id at 6.
33' Id.
34 Id.
13
3
Johnson: Occupational Licensing: How States and Professionals Work to Keep
Published by LAW eCommons, 2018
Loyola Public Interest Law Reporter
law. 5 The excluded consultants lose income, and those wishing to use their
services spend more.3 6 The fact that of the three states that license lactation
consultants, that only Georgia has such an exclusionary law, cuts strongly
against the notion that safety and quality are the primary concerns of
lawmakers 7
Occupational licensing is also implicated in the phenomenon of rising in-
come inequality in the United States. In 1980, the bottom 50% of earners held
20% of the nation's wealth.3 ' That same year, the top 1% of earners held 12%
of the nation's wealth.39 In 2014, the situation reversed; the bottom 50% held
12%, and the top 1% held 20%.40 In terms of average income, the top 1%
earned about 27 times more than the bottom 50% in 1981.41 In 2014, the top
1% earned 81 times more on average than the bottom 50%.42
Recent studies suggest that growing income inequality robbed the United
States of about five GDP percentage points worth of economic growth from
1990-2010.43 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OCED) found that the primary cause of lowered GDP growth is a lack
of opportunity for greater education amongst low-income people.4 4 This lack
of opportunity results in poor social mobility, and hinders the development of
skills needed for better incomes.4 5 Specifically, OCED found that the bottom
forty-percent of households lack access to higher-cost education. 4 6 This in
turn, leads to lower worker productivity, lower wages, and a smaller economic
impact in general.4 7 When one considers the educational requirements of
35 See Jamie Cavanaugh, Breastfeeding can be difficult, but a law to license lactation consultants
may make it even harder, THINK (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:50 GMT), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/
amp/ncna896566.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Howard R. Gold, New data: Inequality runs even deeper than previously thought, CHICAGO
BOOTH REVIEW (May 23, 2017), http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/new-
data-inequality-runs-even-deeper-previously-thought.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
3 Christopher Ingraham, How rising income inequality hurts everyone, even the rich, WONK-
BLOG, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2018/02/06/how-rising-inequality-hurts-everyone-even-the-rich/?utmjterm=.a02d9c4d732d.
44 Id.
4 5 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
4
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many contemporary licensees, the connection between licensing and inequality
becomes clear. Of the 29% of workers who require licenses to work, nearly
48% required a college degree."8 Nearly 68% required some form of continu-
ing education beyond high school.4 9 46% needed to complete an internship.50
For those who find ways to pay for their education, licensing laws can still
prevent them from working in their desired profession.5 1 Fifteen states revoke
occupational licenses when student loan borrowers default on their loans. 52
The New York Times found 8,700 instances of licenses revoked for student loan
default in recent years, while estimating the true number was significantly
higher.5 1 In 2012, the national default rate on student loans was nearly twelve-
percent.54 For some lower-paying licensed positions requiring post-high school
education, the default rate is considerably higher.5 5 Graduates of cosmetology
programs for which federal aid was obtainable default at a rate of seventeen-
percent.56 All but one of the educational institutions whose graduates had the
highest default rates were cosmetology or barber schools.5 7 With an average
salary of $25,000,58 it is not difficult to see how occupational licensing laws
create no-win scenarios for cosmetologists and similarly licensed professions.
Interests contrary to the welfare of the public are at work in reducing so
many employment opportunities. Sandy Meadows failed a section of the Loui-
siana floristry exam judged by a panel of already-licensed florists, five times.5 9
The judges evaluated the candidates according to subjective criteria including
balance, scale, harmony, focal point, accent, repetition and unity.6 0 Fewer than
48 Kleiner, supra note 2 at 8.
4 9 Id.
50 Id
51 See Nick Sibilla, Defaulting on a student loan could cost you your job in these professions,
THINK, NBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/defaulting-
student-loan-could-cost-you-your-job-these-professions-ncna904476.
5 2 Id.
53 Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., When Unpaid Student Loan Bills Mean You Can No Longer
Work, NY TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-
loans-licenses.html?mwrsm=Facebook.
54 Sibilia, supra note 51.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Jacob Sullum, Flower Power, REASON (Jan. 9, 2004), https://reason.com/archives/2004/
01/09/flower-power.
60 Id.
15
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fifty-percent of candidates passed the exam."1 It is clear this presents ample
opportunities for conflicts of interest. Though Louisiana eventually removed
this portion of the exam,6 2 it is far from an unusual occurrence for persons
with potential conflicts of interest to be vested with state power to grant or
deny license to work.63
Some data provides evidence for why licensing board members who are
also market participants might consider factors beyond a candidate's qualifica-
tions and skills." Research indicates that licensing tends to increase prices for
services and goods derived from licensed workers. 5 Some argue that price in-
creases represent a reduction in the probability of poor service.6 " Others note
that the increase presents a potent means for those already in licensed profes-
sions to increase their pay and limit the amount of competition they face in
the market.6 7 Some logical support for the latter proposition is found in the
fact that the professions states choose to license, and the way in which they
license, varies immensely even for the same kinds of jobs.6 "
EXCESSIVE LICENSING AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
When private enterprises engage in anti-competitive efforts, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) can bring actions against them under the Sherman
Antitrust Act." In the early 194 0s, a California raisin farmer argued that a
state agricultural scheme violated the Sherman Act. 70 The farmer's case
reached the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.7 1 The Court held that the
agricultural scheme was immune to the Sherman Act because "[i]t derived its
authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state." 72 From
61 Weissmann & Dieterle, supra note 19.
62 Id.
63 See Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7 (discussing "opportunity hoarding", the phe-
nomenon of licensed market participants creating and/or enforcing licensing regulations).
64 Kleiner, supra note 2 at 15.
65 See Id. (discussing research showing various percentages of price increases from licensing
in different occupations, finding a range of 5-33% increases in prices).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 10.
69 Ingram Weber, The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards, 79 U CHI L
REv 737, 43 (2012).
70 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S 341, 344-50 (1943).
71 Id. at 341.
72 Id. at 350.
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Parker emerged the "state action doctrine."7' The doctrine states that anti-
competitive or monopolistic actions resulting from acts of state legislation do
not expose states to liability under the Sherman Act.74 Since states typically
create licensing boards through acts of their legislatures, even licensing schemes
that would be illegal under the Sherman Act were historically immune from
it.7 5 Federal courts and the FTC often tried to articulate certain conditions for
continued immunity, usually requiring some degree of "active supervision" of
the licensing boards by state authorities.76
In 2015, the Supreme Court fundamentally reduced state-created licensing
board's degree of immunity to the Sherman Act in North Carolina State Board
of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission.7 7 In North Carolina, the
State Board of Dental Examiners is vested by statutory authority with the
power to regulate the practice of dentistry.7' The law establishing the board
requires that six of eight board members be licensed dentists "engaged in the
active practice of dentistry."'79 The licensed dentists of the board are elected
solely by a pool of other licensed dentists.so In 2006, the board issued forty-
seven cease and desist letters to businesses engaged in teeth whitening services
and production of goods used in those services without dentistry licenses." In
the letters, the board heavily implied that it considered teeth-whitening "the
practice of dentistry," without an explicit declaration that it was making such a
determination. 8 2 The board also convinced the North Carolina Board of Cos-
metic Art Examiners to issue similar warnings to cosmetologists engaged in
teeth whitening." Unlicensed teeth-whitening apparently ceased as a result of
these actions.8
Teeth-whitening as a practice did not take off in North Carolina until the
1990s.8 5 Dentists held a monopoly on the practice until approximately 2003,
73 Weber, supra note 69.
74 Id.
75 Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
76 Weber, supra note 69 at 739.
77 See North Carolina State Bd. Of DentalExaminers v. F.TC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104-1107
(2015).
78 Id. at 1107.
79 Id. at 1108.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
17
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when unlicensed practitioners began providing the service.8 " A fair amount of
evidence surfaced suggesting that the board's primary motivations in threaten-
ing legal action were not safety or quality concerns.8 7 Rather, the board was
concerned about competing with the lower prices offered by non-dentists."
In 2010, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against the North
Carolina board, alleging a concerted effort to unlawfully and unfairly prevent
competition with non-licensed teeth-whiteners. 9 In an administrative pro-
ceeding, the board argued that as a state agency, it was immune to anti-trust
actions.9 0 The administrative law judge rejected this argument and found for
the FTC.9 1 The board challenged the administrative determinations in federal
court where the FTC's position was affirmed. 92 The Supreme Court then
agreed to hear the board's appeal.93
In discussing the state-action immunity doctrine as it relates to the Sher-
man Act, the Court found the main justification for the doctrine stems from
principles of federalism." The Court found that the board did not possess the
same degree of sovereignty as the state legislature, particularly where it is con-
trolled by active market participants - in this case dentists who provide whit-
ening services themselves.9 5 The Court settled disagreements in the federal
courts definitively ruling that state-action immunity only applies where (1) the
state action on the part of the board is clearly articulated and expressed state
policy; and (2) the policy is actively supervised by the state.9' While the Court
found that the board was generally acting within the scope of articulated and
expressed state policy in regulating dentistry, it argued that supervision was
lacking where the board's action essentially defined what the practice of den-
tistry was without consulting the state.9 7 The Court went on to explain that
actors created and empowered by the state are not "automatically" sovereign
actors, because they are capable of acts that are unrelated to the state's actions
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Id.
89 Id. at 1108-1109.
90 Id. at 1109.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1110.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
8
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or even contrary to them." Justice Kennedy's opinion stressed that cases in-
volving state boards composed of active market participants are the most sus-
pect kind of boards because of the great potential for conflicts of interest."
The Court strongly emphasized that wherever active market participants sit on
state licensing boards, immunity to antitrust law cannot be assumed.100
The decision in North Carolina State Board ofDental Examiners paved the
way for the FTC to pursue more antitrust actions against state licensing
boards.10 1 Whether the FTC decides to pursue antitrust actions depends on
the priorities of its agency leaders. 10 2 In the wake of North Carolina State Board
ofDental Examiners, it appears that private citizens and organizations are driv-
ing antitrust litigation against state licensing boards.10 The FTC could sup-
port these suits by filing amicus briefs as it did in 2013 in St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille.10 In that case, the Louisiana State Board of Funeral Directors ordered
the monks of a Benedictine Abbey to halt their plans to sell hand-made
wooden caskets to the public.1 0 5 The rules promulgated by the Louisiana
board prohibited anyone from selling caskets except licensed funeral homes.a10
In order to become a licensed funeral home under the regulations, a funeral
home had to (1) consist of a building built to accommodate at least thirty
people; space to display at least six caskets; and have arrangement and embalm-
ing facilities and (2) employ a full-time funeral director. 10 7 One becomes a
full-time funeral director in Louisiana by: acquiring a GED; thirty credit hours
at an accredited college; and completing an apprenticeship during which the
apprenticeship must be the candidates' principal occupation. 10 s Notably ab-
sent from any of the licensing requirements are any rules regarding casket-
making.109
98 Id. at 1111.
9 Id.
100 Id. (emphasis added).
101 See Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
102 Interview with Shoshana Weissmann, Digital Media Manager, R Street Institute (Oct. 5,
2018).
103 See Nathan Standley, Antitrust and Regulatory Boards: Where Do We Go From Here?, 8, n.4
JOURNAL OF NURSING REGULATION 56, 58-59 (2018) (discussing antitrust litigation trends
since North Carolina State Bd OfDental Examiners).
104 Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
105 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F. 3d 215, 217-19 (5th Cir. 2013).
106 Id. at 218.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
19
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The court struck down the board's order, affirming the district court's
finding that it bore no rational relation to any articulated state interest, and
thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 110 The amicus brief filed by the FTC appears to have been persuasive
to the court in this case. A discussion of FTC funeral rules featured heavily in
the opinion."' Due to FTC funeral regulations, Louisiana could not legally
prohibit the use in funerals of caskets purchased from third parties from
outside of Louisiana.1 12 The fact that Louisiana was already using caskets made
outside of its own regulatory framework made it difficult for the board to
argue for the necessity of its rules.1 1
THE FUTURE OF LICENSING REFORM
Given the sheer scale of the issue, it is unlikely that a one size-fits-all solu-
tion will emerge to the many problems posed by excessive occupational licens-
ing laws. Despite that, Republicans and Democrats in Congress agree that the
scope of occupational licensing has grown too large." Many agree that action
is needed to avoid and alleviate harm.1 1 5 Congress can wield its spending
power to incentivize states to cut down on excessive regulations. 1
Congress did just that with the recent passage of the New HOPE Act.1 1
The New HOPE Act allows states to allocate funds they receive through fed-
eral workforce training to study existing state regulations." The studies must
proceed with the goal of eliminating regulatoins adversely impacting employ-
ment.1" The Protecting JOBS Act is another piece of legislation in this vein,
co-sponsored by Senators Marco Rubio and Elizabeth Warren.120 The bill pro-
poses to use the spending power to prohibit any state receiving funds under the
federal student loan program from revoking an occupational license on the
basis of student loan default.12 1 Similarly, the Restoring Board Immunity Act
would guarantee immunity to state boards from the Sherman Act on the con-
110 See St. Joseph Abbey, supra note 105 at 220-227.
111 Id. at 218-226.
112 Id. at 218-220.
113 Id
114 See Dieterle & Weissmann, supra 63.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id
121 Protecting Jobs Act, S. 3065, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
20
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dition that states meet its proposed requirements. 12 2 This would shift the onus
of deregulation onto the states. 1 23
Currently, many states are rapidly deregulating occupational licensing in
specific areas. 124 For example, Illinois recently passed a law completely banning
the practice of revoking occupational licenses on the basis of student loan de-
fault. 12 5 Alaska and Washington State did likewise. 126 Arizona tackled excessive
licensing under the executive discretion of its current governor, Doug Ducey,
who has used his powers against the state dental board and the state cosmetol-
ogy board. 12 7 Seven states passed laws after North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners attempting to ensure active state supervision of their licensing
boards. 128 Georgia and Mississippi's laws allow or require members of the ex-
ecutive branch (in Georgia, the governor; in Mississippi, a commission on
which the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general sit) to review and
veto state licensing regulations before they become effective. 12 9 In Alabama,
only those regulations that involve boards staffed by active market participants
need to submit proposed regulation for review, and the legislature, rather than
executive conducts the review. 1o In Ohio, review of regulations falling under
several categories is the responsibility of a body known as the Ohio Common
Sense Initiative Office.1 3 1 While these kinds of laws are geared directly towards
providing the required state supervision, Idaho takes another approach by
granting the governor the power to fire any licensing board member. 13 2 In
West Virginia, the state Board of Accountancy members undergo antitrust
training.
Post-North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners litigation has trended
mostly in favor of state licensing boards.1 3' A consistent theme of many suits is
that plaintiffs often fail to show that their harm is more than individuated.1 3 5
122 Restoring Board Immunity Act, S. 1649, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018).
123 Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
124 See Standley, supra note 103 at 57.
125 Sibilla, supra note 51.
126 Id.
127 Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
128 Standley, supra note 103 at 57.
129 Id.
130 Id
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See Id. at 58-59.
135 Id. at 58.
21
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It is typically insufficient to allege that an individual person is subjected to an
anti-competitive act in a particular instance; instead a plaintiff must demon-
strate that the whole market at issue is unfairly affected." 6 One case implicat-
ing a state attempt to regulate technological innovations has gone favorably for
the plaintiffs.1 3 7 Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board ended when the Texas
legislature intervened during the proceedings to abrogate the regulation at is-
sue. 1 3 ' Teledoc filed its antitrust suit against the Texas Medical Board after the
board imposed a regulation requiring an initial face-to-face consultation with a
physician before the physician could provide medical services at a distance us-
ing various technologies.1 3 9
CONCLUSION
Though the initial intent of regulating occupations was to protect the
health and safety of the nation's citizens,140 such regulations are now often
used to harm them. In today's increasingly stratified society, the burdens of
unfair licensing often serve to denote the haves from the have-nots."' That the
means to provide for oneself must themselves be purchased should not be a
fact of American life. Though legal trends may be moving in a positive direc-
tion, that is little recompense for people like Sandy Meadows who died alone
and destitute waiting for her day in court.142
136 Id.
137 Id. at 58-59
138 Id. at 59.
139 Id.
140 Carpenter, supra note 1 at 12.
141 Ingraham, supra note 43 at 12.
142 Dieterle & Weissmann, supra note 7.
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